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Research on problem solving typically does not address tasks that involve following detailed 
and/or illustrated step-by-step instructions. Such tasks are not seen as cognitively challeng-
ing problems to be solved. In this paper, we challenge this assumption by analyzing verbal 
protocols collected during an Origami folding task. Participants verbalised thoughts well 
beyond reading or reformulating task instructions, or commenting on actions. In particular, 
they compared the task status to pictures in the instruction, evaluated the progress so far, re-
ferred to previous experience, expressed problems and confusions, and—crucially—added 
complex thoughts and ideas about the current instructional step. The last two categories 
highlight the fact that participants conceptualised this spatial task as a problem to be solved, 
and used creativity to achieve this aim. Procedurally, the verbalisations reflect a typical order 
of steps: reading—reformulating—reconceptualising—evaluating. During reconceptualisa-
tion, the creative range of spatial concepts represented in language highlights the complex 
mental operations involved when transferring the two-dimensional representation into the 
real world. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of problem solving as a mul-
tilayered process involving diverse types of cognitive effort, consider parallels to known con-
ceptual challenges involved in interpreting spatial descriptions, and reflect on the benefit of 
reconceptualisation for cognitive processes.
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Origami is the well-known Japanese art of creating 3-D 
objects by folding paper in a particular manner and order. 
Often, this is achieved by following written instructions sup-
ported by pictures, for example, from a book or webpage. 
How do people interpret abstract action descriptions to cre-
ate a concrete object resembling what is shown in a picture? 
Anyone who has ever struggled with the challenge of folding 
Origami, or used any kind of manual to assemble an object 
or comprehend a newly acquired technical device, will be 
familiar with potential misinterpretations and conceptual 
traps. Learning a new procedure based on pictures and text 
may represent a problem requiring considerable mental 
effort to solve.
Some cognitive complexity arises when conceptually 
transfering from an abstract medium toward concrete 
actions. Moreover, language and depictions, even together, 
as communication media are notoriously underspecified, 
leaving more room for interpretation than one might desire 
(Carston, 2002; Hegarty & Just, 1993; Van Deemter & 
Peters, 1996). In general, if intended actions need instruc-
tions, then there is a problem to solve, and instructions 
can support the task. Even with instructions, subtle deci-
sions and individual conceptualisations engaged during 
problem solving mean that the outcome may not always 
be successful.
Research in problem solving in general has mainly focused 
on identifying creative problem solving, for instance, in order 
to propose adequate sets of step-by-step instructions (e.g., 
Anderson, Douglass, & Qin, 2004). However, the act of following 
instructions has not received extensive research attention. Since 
instructions guide people along a conceptual path, the need for 
creativity and/or individual strategies might seem limited. 
In this paper, we challenge this assumption by treating a 
complex instruction-based task, namely Origami folding, 
as a problem needing a solution via a range of conceptual 
steps. We start by reviewing the role of operations and cog-
nitive strategies in the problem solving literature, and then 
consider insights from research examining text and picture 
comprehension, particularly in the spatial domain. Then we 
report our study in which participants folded an Origami 
object (a flower stem) while thinking aloud. Our analysis 
first addresses the extent to which participants’ verbalisa-
tions reflect creative problem solving processes beyond read-
ing or reformulating and expressing task execution, and then 
focuses on the types of conceptual steps represented in the 
verbalisations. We highlight how participants iteratively 
interpret and reconceptualise each folding step until satis-
fied with the produced object. Then we focus on the recon-
ceptualisation process as a main component of the complex 
problem solving of Origami.
http://dx.doi.org/10.7771/1932-6246.1154
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Mental processes in probleM solving tasks
Following the seminal approach by Newell and Simon 
(1972), human problem solving means conceptually break-
ing down a problem into separate and manageable steps or 
operations. In his representative account of the state of the 
art, Anderson (2004, p. 245) characterises problem solving 
as “goal-directed behavior that often involves setting sub-
goals to enable the application of operators.” Here, “the term 
operator refers to an action that will transform the problem 
state into another problem state. The solution of the overall 
problem is a sequence of these known operators,” and “the 
challenge is to find some possible sequence of operators in 
the problem space that leads from the start state to the goal 
state” (Anderson (2004, p. 245). Accordingly, much of the 
problem solving literature addresses how people identify 
problems and operators to solve them, and how these oper-
ators are ordered into a sequence of actions so as to reach 
a suitable solution, mediated by expertise (Chi, Glaser, & 
Rees, 1982). This is reflected in the relevant literature such as 
Newell and Simon (1972), and more recently in many contri-
butions in the Journal of Problem Solving—compare discus-
sions in Carruthers and Stege (2013) and Fischer, Greiff, and 
Funke (2012), and in introductory reviews such as Anderson 
(2004), which focus on the complex high-level operations 
that need to be mentally organised, based on the range of 
possible actions and problem states. 
It is in this area that think-aloud protocols as data sources 
have been most successful (Ericsson & Simon, 1984). This 
is because the identification and ordering of operators hap-
pens on a high cognitive level; solution steps to a complex 
problem are verbalisable to a great extent, as they are con-
sciously accessible and can be adequately represented in lan-
guage. A vast amount of problem solving research drawing 
on verbalisation data confirms this (e.g., Chi, Bassok, Lewis, 
Reimann, & Glaser, 1989; Gero & McNeill, 1998; Kuipers, 
Moskowitz, & Kassirer, 1988; Ritter & Larkin, 1994; Van 
Gog et al., 2005), in spite of issues about the verbalisability 
of specific kinds of problems such as those involving read-
ing (Afflerbach & Johnston, 1984) or instantaneous insights 
(Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). 
One way of representing a solution path is by way of a 
process model (Fischer, Greiff, & Funke, 2012; Myers, Gluck, 
Gunzelmann, & Krusmark, 2010), for instance, using a cog-
nitive architecture such as ACT-R (e.g., Gugerty & Rodes, 
2007). Such models can be used as a basis for producing 
efficient and cognitively supportive instructions (Anderson 
et al., 2004). The emphasis on creating supportive instruc-
tions strongly suggests that not all instructions can be fol-
lowed in a cognitively straightforward manner. As such, our 
focus in the present paper lies in the opposite direction—
understanding how humans deal with existing instructions 
for a complex task. This differs from the kinds of problems 
addressed in problem solving research typically (or perhaps 
always), that is, ones for which the problem solvers do not 
have access to instructions or manuals. 
Instructions reduce a given problem considerably, by 
offering a breakdown of the original problem into separate 
solution steps (operations) delineating a predetermined 
solution path. What remains is a more fine-grained cognitive 
challenge of moving “from a declarative representation and 
a slow interpretation of the task to a smooth, rapid proce-
dural execution of the task” (Anderson et al., 2004, p. 1046). 
Highlighting this challenge, Anderson, Kline, and Lewis 
(1977) as well as Ball (2004) proposed cognitive models for 
language processing in general. However, to our knowledge, 
the interpretation of instructions (in terms of guided actions) 
has not been addressed directly as a problem-solving task for 
which cognitive processes can be modeled.
A possible reason for this is that cognitive processes in fol-
lowing instructions are not expected to be accessible via exist-
ing measures such as behavioural performance outcomes or 
verbalisation protocols. Transforming a given declarative 
representation into action may conceivably involve entirely 
low-level cognitive processes, since no further identifica-
tion of problem solving steps is required. If that is the case, 
humans who follow instructions to solve a problem should 
not have much to verbalise beyond reading and perhaps 
reformulating the instructions. However, anyone who has 
tried to follow complex instructions would likely attest that 
problem solving opportunities arise in this context.
In this paper we address this assumption, and ask if fol-
lowing instructions for a complex and cognitively challeng-
ing task such as Origami folding may elicit thought processes 
that can, to some extent, emerge in task-concurrent ver-
balisations. In order to see what kinds of challenges may be 
involved in following instructions, we now turn to research 
on the interpretation of textual and visual representations.
interpretation of text, pictures, and instructions
Reading a text activates a number of mental processes 
toward comprehension. According to a bottom-up model 
of discourse comprehension proposed by Kintsch (1988), 
spreading activation of concepts based on linguistic cues 
leads to the construction of a mental representation of the 
text. Zwaan and Radvansky (1998) further suggested that 
readers construct a coherent situation model that integrates 
every newly read clause with the information accumulated 
so far. This process involves complex interactions of long-
term memory retrieval and short-term memory activation. 
Furthermore, intricate grounding processes with respect to 
temporal and spatial domains are necessary for the situation 
model to be consistent. Readers may develop a mental image 
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(Kosslyn, 1980) of the textual content, which may amount to 
a simulation of the situation (Barsalou, 1999), representing 
details such as spatial structures in the visual field (Bergen, 
Lindsay, Matlock, & Narayanan, 2007).
Common to all discourse comprehension approaches is 
the insight that the original text formulation serves as a trig-
ger for accessing conceptual frames, logical and common-
sense based inferences, and knowledge elaborations that are 
not directly expressed in the text. Readers quickly identify 
a message’s gist and typically cannot remember the original 
wording after a very short time (Bransford & Franks, 1972; 
Sachs, 1967). While readers quickly derive a suitable context-
dependent interpretation from their mental model of the 
situation related through a text, more complex inferences 
require further cognitive effort and are not as readily incor-
porated (Garrod, 1985). This effect is similar to problem 
solving in general in that intuitive and effortless reasoning is 
replaced by meta-cognition and higher-level conscious pro-
cesses (only) when particular challenges or problems occur 
(Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007).
 Pictorial information can support text interpretation. For 
instance, Bransford and Johnson (1972) found that people 
better recalled a text illustrated by a picture that provided 
essential context. In terms of comprehension, picture and 
diagram interpretation proceeds similarly to reading com-
prehension in that the gist and conceptual frame are iden-
tified quickly, guiding attention towards relevant aspects 
to serve a particular purpose (Franconeri et al., 2012; 
Henderson, 2003). The process is facilitated by the fact that 
depictions can resemble the mental abstractions necessary 
for remembering and visualising relationships (Tversky, 
2011). When combining pictures and text, comprehen-
sion can be hampered or supported by particular features 
of spatial integration, visual complexity, relevance, and the 
like (Florax & Ploetzner, 2010). Altogether, the comprehen-
sion of descriptions and depictions draws on similar but not 
identical principles, which in the ideal case work together to 
allow for a thorough understanding (Schnotz, 2002; Schnotz, 
Baadte, Johnson, & Mengelkamp, 2012). 
Since different contexts and contents call for different rep-
resentations, identifying an ideal form remains a challenge 
in every case. Ultimately, no representation is complete or 
directly accessible to the human mind; intricate comprehen-
sion processes are required to gain an adequate interpreta-
tion. Different modes of representation affect the distribu-
tion of cognitive load in systematic ways, depending on the 
represented content and its adequacy relative to the recipi-
ent’s level of expertise (Cook, 2006). For instance, the extent 
to which complete and detailed information is necessary or 
beneficial for a reader depends on their background. With a 
high level of previous knowledge to draw on, readers benefit 
from the challenge posed by less complete representations 
that call for deeper processing. Texts that leave room for the 
readers’ inferences support a more thorough understanding 
due to the increased activation of interpretive processes and 
linking to one’s knowledge base (McNamara, Kintsch, Butler 
Songer, & Kintsch, 1996). Relatedly, different types of learn-
ing materials are useful for different purposes (Belenky & 
Schalk, 2014); while initial learning is enhanced by grounding 
in background information, transfer is easier when abstract-
ing across contexts (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). However, learn-
ers differ in the extent to which they can generalise from 
examples. Crucially for our purposes, learners who success-
fully generalised provided explanations for themselves while 
reading, displaying their deep understanding, more than 
those who failed to generalise (Chi et al., 1989). 
Comprehending instructions and manuals involves these 
general interpretation processes (Franck, 2004) with their 
complex interplay of context, represented information, 
background knowledge, and expertise, plus the challenges 
of resolving references to relevant objects (Weiß, Pfeiffer, 
Eikmeyer, & Rickheit, 2006), and transforming the infor-
mation towards a practical purpose—actions to be under-
taken in the real world (Daniel & Tversky, 2012). Paralleling 
the more general findings on text comprehension, Marcus, 
Cooper, and Sweller (1996) argue that the addition of dia-
grams can reduce cognitive load, making instructions easier 
to follow. Mediated by their ability and expertise in the sub-
ject area, readers construct a mental model by incremen-
tally combining local with global information (Hegarty & 
Just, 1993). This is supported by situation-based affordances 
provided through experiential (non-propositional, non-
abstract) background knowledge (Glenberg & Robertson, 
1999). Real-world objects and displays offer visual feedback 
cues supporting action directly, reducing memory load and 
instantaneously suggesting possible actions (Larkin, 1989).
The processes and requirements involved with follow-
ing instructions have been quite thoroughly researched in 
the context of route descriptions. For instance, Lovelace, 
Hegarty, and Montello (1999) proposed elements that make 
up “good” route directions. Completeness, mention of seg-
ments and turns, and particular types of landmarks contrib-
uted to route description quality ratings. Additionally, Allen 
(2000) showed that preserving the natural order and focus-
ing on action information at choice points is important, as 
is taking the addressee’s knowledge into account (this also 
affects the route planned, cf. Hölscher, Tenbrink, & Wiener, 
2011). While visual information such as maps is just as useful 
for wayfinding as verbal route descriptions (Meilinger & 
Knauff, 2008), Lee and Tversky (2005) suggest that adding 
visual landmark information supports comprehension, in 
line with the insight that visual imagery can promote reason-
ing, especially in spatial settings (Knauff, Mulack, Kassubek, 
Salih, & Greenlee, 2002; Tversky, 2011). 
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Particular challenges arise where spatial descriptions are 
underspecified or ambiguous, as is frequently found. The 
analysis of dialogues provides hints about the mental activity 
engaged in such cases. For instance, Tenbrink, Coventry, and 
Andonova (2008) found that addressees frequently suggested 
reformulations of, or additions to, spatial descriptions. Such 
reconceptualisations arise because of complex inference pro-
cesses involved in spatial settings, as specified by Krause, 
Reyle, and Schiehlen (2001). Muller and Prévot (2009) iden-
tified types of feedback addressee’s provided as a function 
of the information given by the speaker, enabling the dia-
logue partners to negotiate spatial representation challenges. 
Overall, the dialogic patterns reflect the need to integrate 
spatial descriptions into a coherent spatial mental model. 
Together, these results point to a high amount of creativity 
and cognitive processing on several levels (direct and effort-
less, as well as mediated and meta-cognitive) when following 
verbal descriptions of space. In other words, they point to the 
need for problem solving when following instructions.
following origaMi instructions: a probleM-solving task?
For tasks like Origami folding, few studies have explored 
mental processes involved in interpreting illustrated instruc-
tions. In face-to-face instruction of Origami, learners rely 
intensely on the instructor’s gestures and actions to support 
the learning process (Furuyama, 2000). Because Origami 
can enhance spatial thought processes, training can lead 
to student gains when implemented into school curricula 
(Higginson & Colgan, 2001; Robichaux & Rodrigue, 2003; 
Taylor & Hutton, 2013). Algorithms for automatically inter-
preting graphical depictions of the folding process high-
light the conceptual challenges and routines involved (e.g., 
Shimanuki, Kato, & Watanabe, 2003). While Sabbah (1985) 
provided a connectionist model for recognising line draw-
ings of Origami objects, to our knowledge, the problem solv-
ing stages or conceptual steps of following Origami instruc-
tions have not been addressed. 
Our aim in this paper is to provide insights about higher-
level cognitive processes involved with interpreting illus-
trated instructions for folding a complex 3-D object. Rather 
than attempting to capture the finer processes involved in 
reading and picture comprehension, we focus on procedures 
and patterns reflected in think-aloud protocols, collected 
while following Origami instructions, and address patterns 
of variability in relation to individual and situation specific 
differences. Based on the research summarised above, we 
contrast alternative outcomes of our study: 
•	 If instructions already spell out the main problem 
solving components typically found in verbalisable 
reports and thus accessible on a high level of cogni-
tion, and if there is no actual problem left to solve, then 
participants should simply follow instructions step by 
step, and carry out the task as outlined. Verbalisations 
would then consist of reading and slightly reformulat-
ing or adapting the instructions during the reading 
comprehension process, and commenting on how the 
given task is put into action.
•	 If following instructions is a problem to solve in itself, 
this should be expressed in the think-aloud protocols 
in terms of creative thinking or additional ideas that 
are not expressed in the instructions. Furthermore, 
participants might express problems in carrying out 
the task, and verbalise considerations as to how they 
might be solved. 
Whether or not following Origami instructions can be 
seen as a problem solving task might differ depending on 
various factors. We expect variation based on participants’ 
Origami experience, and we expect instruction steps to differ 
in terms of difficulty. These factors should be reflected in the 
verbal protocols, revealing how the conceptual challenge of 
following instructions is met according to the diverse factors 
involved, and what types or parts of instructions are particu-
larly challenging. 
Beyond identifying the existence of the relevant verbali-
sation types and indicators of the phenomena just outlined, 
we ask (qualitatively) how these thoughts are expressed in 
language, and what kinds of problem solving strategies and 
relevant verbalised concepts may occur, as the previous lit-
erature does not provide a sufficient basis for making direct 
predictions in this regard.
In response to the assumption that cognitive processes 
involved in interpreting instructions may be too low-
level to be captured in think-aloud protocols, we employ 
Cognitive Discourse Analysis (CODA; Tenbrink, 2015) to 
address systematic features of the data. CODA was devel-
oped to capture deeper insights into cognitive processes, 
including those speakers might not be able to consciously 
verbalise, but nevertheless emerge in systematic patterns 
of verbalisations. The methodology extends the seminal 
approach to verbal protocol analysis by Ericsson and Simon 
(1984) by taking a closer look at the features of the language 
used to express thoughts and cognitive processes captured 
in a verbal protocol. The rationale behind this approach is 
that speakers make specific choices out of the more gen-
eral network of lexicogrammatical options at their disposal. 
Such choices are meaningful in ways that speakers may not 
be aware of; for instance, they reflect a particular concep-
tual perspective and granularity level that appears natural 
to the speaker, but is in no way predetermined by the task. 
In this paper, the main CODA-based contribution concerns 
speakers’ choices of spatial terms that were not directly part 
of the verbal instruction given to them, expressing their 
conceptual creativity while doing the task. 
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origaMi study
procedure
This study was reviewed and approved by the Tufts University 
Institutional Review Board. Twenty-four Tufts University 
undergraduates (14 male, 10 female), all native English speak-
ers, participated in this study after having been fully informed 
about the procedures. They were trained to think aloud (see 
Appendix A), following suggestions by Ericsson and Simon 
(1984). Then their first task was to fold the Origami tulip, 
first the stem and then the blossom, following instructions 
provided on a computer screen. During these tasks they 
thought aloud while following the instructions (Appendix 
B). Participants could move through the instructions at their 
own pace, scrolling back and forth as they saw fit. The experi-
menter gave no advice except in the case of being stuck fol-
lowing a mistake. In such cases the experimenter provided a 
simple hint to reconsider the previous folding step. In cases 
of inactivity or silence, participants were encouraged to go 
on trying and to keep thinking aloud. Also, the experimenter 
provided positive feedback. A pilot test showed that, due to 
the considerable challenge of this task, such encouragement 
was vital. In spite of these adjustments, which were necessary 
to ensure a smooth task procedure and an actual outcome of 
each participant’s efforts, it was made clear that there was to 
be no interaction about the task. The think-aloud expectation 
was transparent to the participants, who accordingly did not 
address the experimenter while verbalising their thoughts.
The participants’ second task was to determine, in a series 
of trials, which of three Origami objects matched the crease 
patterns of an unfolded object. Finally, they completed three 
spatial abilities tests: the redrawn Vandenberg and Kuse 
mental rotation (Peters et al., 1995), mental paper folding 
(Shepard & Feng, 1972), and the Santa Barbara Solids Test 
(Cohen & Hegarty, 2012). We focus here on the cognitive 
processes reflected in verbalisations while folding the stem, 
without action coding (see Taylor & Tenbrink, 2013, for a dif-
ferent analysis of the same data set). The instruction for this 
task (represented in Appendix C) showed 13 folding steps as 
pictures associated with a brief textual instruction (e.g., “Put 
the paper in front of you, with the point toward the top”).
results
Participants took between 3:05 and 10:07 minutes to fold the 
flower stem (mean = 04:54; standard deviation = 1:36). Eleven 
of the 24 participants received no hints by the experimenter, 
and the most hints given were four (mean = 1.16; standard 
deviation = 1.34). While folding, participants varied consid-
erably with respect to how much they verbalised, producing 
between 113 and 1,738 words each (mean = 402.38; standard 
deviation = 337.75).
Folding success was assessed by independent ratings 
(7-point Likert scale) of the photographed stems. A sepa-
rate group of 25 Tufts undergraduate students, who were not 
informed about the major goals of this study, rated each pho-
tograph. They rated success by comparing the photographs 
to the Origami instruction picture (see Appendix B), indicat-
ing the perceived similarity. Ratings ranged from 1.28 to 5.48 
(mean = 3.97; standard deviation = 0.90). In other words, 
Origami folding results were judged as quite varied, cover-
ing almost the full range from failure to considerable suc-
cess, although none of the resulting stems were unanimously 
considered entirely successful. 
As would be expected, success ratings were marginally 
negatively correlated with the number of hints (r = -0.37, 
n = 24, p = .073). More interestingly, success was reliably neg-
atively correlated with the number of words read (r = -0.44, 
n = 24, p < .05) rather than produced in more creative ways 
(see more detailed analysis of verbalisations below). That is, 
the more successful people were, the less they read instruc-
tions aloud. Apart from that, success was not related to any of 
our analysis criteria (including time to fold the stem), and will 
therefore not be further addressed as a determining factor in 
the analysis of the problem solving process as expressed in 
the verbalisations. Verbosity (i.e., the total number of words 
produced by a participant), for instance, was not related to 
folding success (r = 0.081, n = 24, p>.05), although it cor-
related with time to fold the stem (r = .674, n = 24, p < .01). 
No effects of gender emerged for any of our analysis criteria.
content categories and verbal creativity
All think-aloud data produced while folding the stem were 
transcribed and segmented into units containing a single 
thought or piece of information, such as “um, alright so I’m 
just trying to make sure it’s as close to the fold as possible.” 
Each unit was annotated in relation to the specific folding 
step (cf. Appendix C) to which it belonged. 
As our first analysis goal, we explored the extent to which 
the verbalisations exhibited creative thought, as opposed to 
directly following the instructions. To assess this, we associ-
ated the content of units, or partial units if appropriate, with 
one of the following operationalised categories:
•	 Reading task description: parts that are read aloud or 
repeated from the written instruction about the rel-
evant folding step.
•	 Reformulating description without new thoughts: con-
veying the same content as the instruction in a differ-
ent syntactic or lexical form.
•	 Additional ideas about a step: introducing new ideas 
in describing this step. These were further subcat-
egorised into the following (not mutually exclusive) 
types: 
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 » orientation of the paper to be folded
 » object quality: trying to get a nice result 
 » alignment of the folds or edges with respect to 
each other
 » crease quality: making nice and sharp folds
 » comparison to instruction: trying to match partici-
pant’s own result with the instruction (including 
the picture)
 » within-step repetition: doing the same action twice 
(e.g., for left and right sides) within a folding step
 » across-step repetition: the current step repeats a 
previous one (i.e., is described as identical)
 » across-step difference: the current step is compared 
to a previous one, identifying a difference
 » spatial description: patterns in the current status 
of the object
 » adding semantics: associating meaning with some 
part(s) of the current status of the object
 » other.
•	 Evaluation: the speaker evaluates their own work or prog-
ress so far in general terms, beyond the current folding step.
•	 References to background knowledge: for example, not-
ing patterns based on experience.
•	 Expression of problems: considering how to do this 
step, expressions of matching problems, and so on.
•	 Task communication: the participant seeks confir-
mation about the procedure, comments on general 
aspects, refers to action (including looking at the pic-
tures), explicitly starts the next step, or evaluates the 
instructions (as in “that makes sense”).
•	 Other: anything ambiguous or not fitting into the pre-
vious categories.
As discussed above, we predicted that Reading task 
description, Reformulating description without new thoughts, 
and Task communication categories would reflect simple text 
interpretation and relevant action. All other categories go 
beyond this basic instruction-following process and were 
identified post hoc. They therefore represent a qualitative 
analysis of the types of thoughts participants verbalised.
 Annotations were complete (all verbalisations were cat-
egorised) and (by our definition) mutually exclusive (i.e., no 
partial unit was associated with more than one main category, 
although the subcategories within the category Additional 
ideas about a step were not mutually exclusive). Annotation 
was achieved through an iterative multi-annotator coding 
process, ensuring optimised operationalisation of annota-
tion definitions through repetitive in-depth scrutiny of the 
data, as well as consistency in coding by revisiting each data 
set multiple times as required. Following preliminary annota-
tion by two independent student assistants, the process was 
only declared complete after both authors agreed with every 
instance of the annotations suggested by the students, follow-
ing extended discussions of individual cases where needed. 
This iterative process was considered more adequate to the 
nature of this particular data set than a quantitative assessment 
of an inter-coder reliability measure (which is more typical).
Verbalisations coded as Additional ideas and Expressions 
of problems in particular reveal the conceptual issues asso-
ciated with the Origami task (see Table 1 for examples of 
Additional ideas). Twelve of the 24 participants produced 
spatial descriptions such as “there’s a straight line across here 
at the top,” “making it more narrow,” “touching the middle,” 
“I have a triangle,” “that one is horizontal,” and so on, reveal-
ing that they identified spatial patterns within the folding 
process and resultant objects. This reflects a reconceptuali-
sation of the original Origami instruction. Altogether there 
were 50 spatial descriptions of this kind.
Descriptions like these involved spatial vocabulary not 
included in a particular step’s original instruction. To opera-
tionalise and verify this intuitive, content-based impression, 
we identified all instances of spatial terms used in relation 
to an instructional step, but not included in the relevant 
Table 1.
 Examples (taken from various individuals) for reconceptualisations categorised as Additional ideas 
Instruction 
step no.
Instruction Utterance Subcategory
2 Fold the left corner over to the right one, and 
firmly straighten out the fold.
so that I get a triangle Spatial description
5 Fold the bottom edges onto the midline. this looks like a crane Adding semantics
5 Fold the bottom edges onto the midline. just take one corner and it’s 
gonna go down a little bit
Spatial description
8 Fold the lower tip onto the upper one. it looks like I have to 
match the height
alignment; comparison 
to instruction
11 Fold it back, and then diagonally to the left. try and make it 
symmetrical
alignment
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instruction (referred to as “new spatial terms” for short). We 
found a reliable correlation of “new spatial term use” with 
the “spatial description” subcategory within the Additional 
ideas category (r = 0.57, n = 24, p < .01; see also Taylor & 
Tenbrink, 2013). Th us, participants read the instruction and 
associated diff erent spatial (and related) concepts with the 
action described, and expressed this in “new spatial terms.” 
Th is provides insight into their cognitive fl exibility in deal-
ing with this task. Figure 1 shows the number of occurrence 
of the 25 most frequently used “new spatial terms,” along 
with how many participants used each term. Th e most fre-
quent term used in this way was side; 17 participants used it 
104 times in situations where it was not part of the instruc-
tion. Th e remaining terms used, along with their frequency 
of occurrence, can be found in Appendix D. Th is impres-
sively wide range of spatial terms highlights the creativity of 
thought employed by our participants. 
As further illustrated in Figure 2, participants varied 
considerably in the extent to which they used “new spatial 
terms” throughout their verbalisations; counts ranged from 
1 to 130 (mean = 21.38, median = 15). Th e production of 
spatial terms by individuals was (expectedly) correlated with 
the overall number of words produced (r = 0.88, n = 24, 
p < .01) as well as with other subcategories of Additional 
ideas)—clearly, the more verbose participants were, the more 
creative they became in their (spatial) language use. Also, use 
of new spatial terms was correlated with previous experience, 
as we report in more detail below. 
Importantly, participants were not necessarily repetitive in 
their reformulations; each instruction step contained its own 
challenges and could therefore lead to new reconceptualisa-
tions and (as a consequence) diff erent term use. To illustrate 
this, a closer look at the highest scoring dataset (130 new spa-
tial terms) reveals that this participant produced 15 diff erent 
spatial nouns: angle, baselines, corner, crease, direction, end, 
edge, ﬂ ap, line, position, shape, side, symmetry, three dimen-
sion, way. In addition there were 7 diff erent verbs: bisect, end 
up, go, intersect, match up, switch, turn, and 30 other spatial 
terms: along, around, at, back, center, close, diagonal, down, 
even, ﬂ at, halfway, here, in, in half, into, lopsided, on, open, 
opposed, out, outside, over, overlap, straight, symmetrical, 
three dimensional, to, toward, up, vertical. So, in total, this 
participant produced 52 diff erent spatial terms, each about 
three times on average, to total 130. Of these terms, only 3 
Figure 1. Frequency of “new spatial terms” used, along with the number of individuals who used 
the term at least once in a creative way. 
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nouns and 10 “other” spatial terms occurred anywhere in 
the original instructions. Th is participant also produced the 
second highest amount of utterances categorised as “spa-
tial description” (namely seven), including further interest-
ing references to concepts such as a kite like shape, valley vs. 
mountain folds, small ﬂ aps on the side, and rationalisations 
such as that little crease, that little corner, that obtuse angle 
right there, was meant to intersect with the centre line. 
Obviously, this particular participant was both highly ver-
bal and outstandingly creative in range of spatial vocabulary. 
Other participants did show a similar kind of fl exibility, albeit 
with lower frequencies of ‘new’ spatial terms (cf. Figure 2). 
Although the types of spatial descriptions produced by the 
participants varied considerably, these examples provide a 
representative impression of verbalisations when consider-
ing spatial instructions. Th e details and frequencies may dif-
fer, but the procedure appears to be comparable across those 
participants who produced “spatial descriptions” and “new 
spatial terms.”
Verbalisations of problems were typically less explicit; 
participants said things like “that doesn’t seem right” or “I 
was a little confused of this,” without specifying further. 
More explicit statements in this category include “I wonder 
if that was still supposed to be folded somehow,” “does the 
angle sort of matter?,” “that’s a little lopsided,” and “I think is 
just opening it up, right?” Th us, participants wondered aloud 
(without interacting with the experimenter) about the pre-
cise action to be carried out or the degree of precision to 
be pursued, were unsatisfi ed with the product, or tried to 
interpret the formulation used in the instructions. Oft en 
enough, this included some degree of spatial term use as well 
(i.e., verbalisation of spatial thinking).
verbalisation patterns
Aft er having identifi ed the content and signifi cance of the 
verbalisation categories as just outlined, the next step was 
to address patterns of recurring thoughts or processes as 
refl ected in the think-aloud data. For this purpose, we ana-
lyzed the frequency and distribution of the categories (ignor-
ing the Other category, which was rarely used and contained 
unintelligible parts that did not lend themselves to counting) 
in relation to folding steps and participants, and determined 
the order of category mention within each step.
Th e category Reading was used most oft en (232 times, aver-
aging 0.74 per participant and step), and Background knowl-
edge least oft en (28 times, averaging 0.09). Th e other catego-
ries fell in between (Reformulating: 154 (0.49); Additional 
ideas: 165 (0.53); Evaluation: 49 (0.16); Problems: 105 (0.34); 
Task communication: 191 (0.61)). Participants used most 
Figure 2. Number of “new spatial terms” used by individual participants, sorted according to 
frequency.
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categories frequently, though not necessarily for each step. 
All but two participants read parts of the instructions ver-
batim, all participants reformulated something at least once, 
and all but two formulated additional ideas about at least one 
step. Seventeen participants evaluated their own work, 20 
expressed problems, and all except one communicated about 
the task. Only references to background knowledge were less 
frequent, occurring with only 8 participants (although 22 of 
24 reported some previous Origami experience; see further 
details below). Figure 3 illustrates the frequency with which 
each participant used a category.
Th e distribution of the categories across the folding steps 
(i.e., associated to the steps shown in Appendix C) was infor-
mative. Readings and reformulations were fairly evenly dis-
tributed across the folding steps (ranging between 8 and 18 
mentions by diff erent participants in each of the 13 steps), 
indicating that the content of a folding step did not aff ect (in 
any obvious way) whether an instruction was read verbatim, 
reformulated, or just comprehended without verbalising. Th e 
other categories were not distributed equally. For instance, 
the instruction for folding step 4 was “Turn around 180 
degrees,” which never induced any further ideas, nor evalu-
ations or references to background knowledge, and only one 
expression of problems. In contrast, folding step 6 was “Fold 
the bottom edges onto the midline once again,” which led 15 
(of the 24) participants to formulate additional ideas such as 
“so the same thing” (across-step repetition), “the same with 
the left ” (within-step repetition), or “so in half again” (spa-
tial description). Th e other categories were represented more 
frequently in other steps. Figure 4 visualises the distribution 
of category usage across folding steps. 
To shed further light on diff erences between individual 
folding steps in terms of behaviourally refl ected cogni-
tive complexity, we calculated the mean number of words 
produced as well as the time needed for each folding step. 
Divided by 10 to matc h scale, the mean number of words is 
imposed within Figure 4 (dashed line) to reveal a clear visual 
eff ect: the number of words used along with a specifi c folding 
step generally matches the pattern of number of participants 
producing verbalisation types for the same step. Th e number 
of words peaks at folding step 3 (mean = 72.04 words pro-
duced) followed by folding step 10 (mean = 50.71); these are 
the steps for which most participants explicitly mentioned 
problems. Th e lowest number of words were produced along 
with folding steps 4 (mean = 11.46) and 7 (mean = 16.33). 
Both of these triggered few problems or additional ideas, and 
the like, as shown in Figure 4. Th e folding times needed for 
these steps matched this pattern, with a relatively high aver-
age fold time of 47 seconds for step 3 followed by 30 seconds 
for step 10. In contrast, the simpler folding step 4 required 
Figure 3. Stacked frequency of category usage across participants. 
docs.lib.purdue.edu/jps  2015 | Volume 8
T. Tenbrink & H. A. Taylor Conceptual Transformation and Cognitive Processes
11
only 10 seconds on average, and step 7 took 13 seconds. Th is 
converging evidence points to systematically diff erent levels 
of cognitive complexity as refl ected by various behavioural 
measures, leading to diff erences in the verbalised problem 
solving processes.
In addition to diff erences between steps, there were also 
diff erences between individuals. For instance, three partici-
pants read verbatim parts of every step, while two never read. 
Based on the ratio of reading to reformulating, we identifi ed 
10 readers, 5 reformulators, and 9 participants who were neu-
tral in this respect (ratio ranging between 0.7 and 1.83 or, 
in one case, producing only one reformulation and no read-
ings). Th is indicates individual approaches to dealing with 
the original formulation and reverbalisation. Furthermore, 
one participant produced additional ideas for as many as 11 
of the 13 steps, while most others did this far less frequently 
(overall mean = 5.17). Also, 8 participants never explicitly 
referred to the picture, while the others did this at least once 
and up to four times throughout the folding task (overall 
mean = 1.54). 
Given this diversity in verbalising concepts and ideas rel-
evant to the folding process, we looked for systematic pat-
terns based on the order in which these ideas were men-
tioned, if they occurred at all within a folding step. While the 
above analysis merely established whether or not a category 
appeared in a folding step, a closer look revealed that they 
did not appear in random order, in spite of a high diver-
sity of combinatorial possibilities. Consider the example in 
Table 2. Aft er a discourse marker alright marking the start 
of the task, the participant reads step 1, with a slight gram-
matical reformulation at its end (me rather than you). Th is is 
followed by an action comment (task communication): I’m 
doing that. Th e phrase next thing I need to is again a comment 
on carrying out the task, introducing the reading of the next 
instruction. In the next line, “so it’s lined up” expresses the 
additional concept of “alignment,” not explicitly given in the 
instruction. Th is is followed by a slight reformulation of the 
next part of the instruction, “straighten out the fold.” From 
here, the participant proceeds to the next step, which starts 
by reading the instruction and communicating about the 
task. Th e phrase so I guess that means indicates a certain con-
cern about the correct interpretation, followed by a reformu-
lation of the task (to the center rather than midline), without 
expressing a diff erent idea. Th e next three utterances refl ect 
the participant’s conceptual development moving away from 
the original instruction; none of these are directly expressed 
in the instruction. While the instruction only uses a plural 
form (“edges”), the action itself needs to be carried out twice, 
which is expressed by I gotta do it with the other side (coded 
as within-step repetition). 
Figure 4. Amount of participants using a category in each folding step (1–13), and mean number of 
words used for each step (divided by 10 to match scale).
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In contrast, the Table 3 example reflects an inability to 
move away from the original instruction. The task instruction 
is repeatedly read, interspersed by expressions of confusion. 
A close scrutiny of the linguistic data led to the identifica-
tion of a basic recurring pattern as follows: 
reading—reformulating—reconceptualising—evaluating 
Participants started out by reading a folding step, (possi-
bly) followed by reformulations. Conceptually moving away 
from the original wording, they would then (in more fortu-
nate cases than the one shown in Table 3) verbalise additional 
ideas about this folding step, and then possibly evaluate their 
product. Although past experience could be verbalised at any 
point in the process, it typically appeared only after evalua-
tion (if any). Although folding actions are not reflected di-
rectly in the verbal data and were not annotated in this study, 
participants sometimes referred to action (e.g., “which I did 
here”), and this was categorised as task communication. This 
emerged as a free-floating category, appearing anywhere in 
the process (including leading over to next step). This reflects 
how participants were continuously acting on their object (as 
expected), following the instructions as soon as they were 
able to interpret them, based on comprehension and recon-
ceptualisation processes. Problems led to disruptions of this 
process, with participants either unable to move away from 
the instruction at all as in the above example, or starting 
again by reading, or anywhere else within the overall process.
To verify this intuition, we identified for all utterances 
made by participants in relation to individual folding steps 
whether or not they were consistent with the pattern read-
ing—reformulating—reconceptualising—evaluating, treating 
expression of problem as a reset to start, and ignoring task 
communication and other. Steps could be skipped, since 
think-aloud protocols can never be expected to represent 
all thought processes exhaustively). A paired t-test (compar-
ing consistent vs. inconsistent patterns within each folding 
step) showed that the verbalisations within steps were con-
sistent with this overall process scheme significantly more 
Table 2.
Think aloud example, moving from reading to reconceptualising
Step Category Utterance
1 read, reformulate alright. so put the paper in front of you with one corner pointing towards me
1 task communication I’m doing that
2 task communication, read next thing I need to fold the left corner over to the right one
2 task communication, additional 
idea, reformulate so I’m folding that so it’s lined up and then straightening out the fold
3 task communication, read so it’s telling me to open the paper again
3 task communication, read so I do that and fold the bottom edges towards the midline
3 express problem, reformulate so I guess that means fold this part to the center here
3 additional idea and I’m trying to do that so it’s as even as possible
3 additional idea now I gotta do it with the other side
3 additional idea and crease that part there
Table 3.
Think aloud example involving expression of problems
Step Category Utterance
3 read uh, open the paper again
3 read, reformulate fold the bottom edges towards the middle
3 express problem okay, um, how should I do that?
3 read uh, open the paper and fold the bottom edges toward the midline
3 express problem but how did it turn out like that?
3 express problem that’s kinda confusing; also kind of annoying
3 other so, do do do
3 reformulate fold open
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often than they were inconsistent (p < .001). However, even 
within-step verbalisations that did not precisely fit this pat-
tern seemed close enough to support the overall scheme, as 
in the Table 2 example (so I’m folding that so it’s lined up and 
then straightening out the fold): Here, the process of reading 
was interrupted as a partial step triggered some thoughts 
(here: alignment of the folds, as a type of additional idea). 
Nevertheless, the overall scheme ranging from mere read-
ing via slightly reformulating to reconceptualising and eval-
uating (and possibly reminiscing previous experiences) was 
generally followed, in a flexible way.
experience
Since previous work on problem solving consistently showed 
effects of background knowledge and previous experience, 
affecting not only overall performance but also problem 
solving strategies and pathways, we finally addressed how 
reported Origami experience related to verbalisation in the 
given task. Of our 24 participants, when asked about their 
background, 19 reported having some previous experience 
with Origami, 3 a lot, and 2 none. In spite of the somewhat 
uneven distribution in this regard, we were able to detect 
some interesting associations using Pearson’s correlation. 
Experience was positively correlated with overall verbos-
ity, that is, number of words produced (r = 0.48, n = 24, 
p  <  .05); this corresponded to a higher number of units (r   =    0.37, 
n = 24, p < .05) as well as a higher number of words per unit 
(r = 0.48, n = 24, p < .05). Looking at content, it turned out 
that the verbalisations were more creative with more experi-
ence; experience was marginally negatively correlated with 
the number of words read (r = -0.35, n = 24, p = .091), but 
positively with the number of words expressing additional 
ideas (r = 0.38, n = 24, p = .067). More experienced Origami 
users carefully compared their work with the instruction 
often (r = 0.56, n = 24, p < .01), and they used more new 
spatial terms to verbalise their thoughts (r = 0.48, n = 24, 
p  <  .05). Also, they reliably used more words to communicate 
about the task (r = 0.56, n = 24, p < .01), and they (expect-
edly) talked more about past experience (r = 0.58, n = 24, 
p < .01). Along these lines, previous experience affected how 
people distributed their verbalisations, without fundamen-
tally changing the overall pattern (as there were no outliers 
with respect to any of our analysis categories). 
discussion
Most problem solving research focuses on unaided tasks, 
reflecting an implicit assumption that instructions guide 
cognitive processes sufficiently to leave few or no problems 
to be solved. Generally, the extant literature suggests that 
step-by-step instructions lead rather than trigger trains of 
thought; complete instructions should leave little room for 
creativity. Accordingly, think-aloud protocols when fol-
lowing such instructions should not contain much content 
beyond a reflection of the guidance the instructions provide. 
However, because findings on reading and visual compre-
hension point to a more complex process when interpret-
ing action instructions, our study set out to challenge this 
assumption. We used a task that followed established tradi-
tions in the Japanese art of Origami folding. It used step-by-
step instructions that were complete in the sense of guiding 
the reader through the whole process from a blank piece 
of paper to the completed product, without omitting any 
actions. Indeed, none of our participants mentioned a need 
for further instructions; any problems that were expressed 
had to do with the actions involved within an instruction 
step. The guidance was complete at the overall task’s high-
est level. Nevertheless, it left room for interpretation, high-
lighting a different layer of problem solving processes. Our 
results, drawn from verbalisations uttered throughout the 
task, point to distinct cognitive processes involved in under-
standing and completing the instructions. 
Notably, the level of problem solving we see here does not 
correspond, as might have been assumed, to an automated 
subconscious level of task execution. Instead, our results sug-
gest interpretation processes that are consciously accessible 
and verbalisable to a high extent, even where the main solu-
tion steps are available in both verbal and pictorial format. 
Our results speak to a range of findings across domains 
such as general problem solving, instruction interpretation, 
spatial reasoning, discourse comprehension, educational 
practices, and verbalisation of thought. We will address each 
of these in turn.
Research on problem solving, in general, typically aims 
to identify the main solution steps (sub-goals) and cognitive 
strategies employed commonly by humans solving complex 
problems (following Newell & Simon, 1972). Once these 
have been determined, for example based on verbal proto-
cols (Ericsson & Simon, 1984), they can be represented in 
terms of computational models and cognitive architectures 
(Anderson, 2004; Gugerty & Rodes, 2007; Pizlo et al., 2006). 
Beyond high-level cognitive operators, such models also 
include more fine-grained representations of how the action 
steps are accomplished. However, typically these are not 
expressed in terms of problem solving processes as such. 
Our research suggests a different picture. Apparently, 
specifying the main solution steps in a complete set of step-
by-step instructions does not eliminate the need for problem 
solving. Instead, the main solution steps provide a coarse level 
of problem solving, but leave room for more fine-grained 
challenges. Our verbal data highlight the cognitive complex-
ity and creativity involved in this process, going well beyond 
the immediate and automatic interpretation of clearly laid out 
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instructions. In our data, verbalisations coded as Additional 
ideas signaled how the participants went beyond the original 
instruction, that is, the surface of the formulation. This was a 
frequent category in our data, used in about half of the folding 
steps by each participant; with two exceptions, all participants 
did this at least once. Therefore, the reconceptualisation of the 
original instruction by adding related ideas played a major 
role within the procedural pattern detected in our data. 
However, such reconceptualisation was not engaged 
within every instruction step to the same extent. Very sim-
ple instructions (e.g., turn paper around) could be directly 
transformed to action and did not appear to trigger further 
thoughts. With increasing task complexity, participants took 
consistently more time to accomplish and words to verbal-
ise an instruction step. These reconceptualisations highlight 
the active consideration of how to appropriately follow the 
instructions. Thus, rather than simply following the instruc-
tions verbatim and activating automated processes, par-
ticipants actively engaged in thought processes, going well 
beyond the step-by-step guidance given to them. In line 
with previous literature on cognitive complexity (Alter et al., 
2007; Garrod, 1985), this effect was mediated by the level of 
challenge posed by any individual action step. More complex 
instructions led to more verbalised thoughts and inferences, 
as well as increased expression of problems.
The literature pointing to the existence of complex inter-
pretation processes and inferences involved in reading and 
pictorial comprehension (Hegarty & Just, 1993; Kosslyn, 
1980; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998) corroborates our results. 
These processes take the reader well beyond a message’s sur-
face representation (Bransford & Franks, 1972; Franck, 2004) 
and trigger cognitive effort at levels similar to other problem 
solving processes (Alter et al., 2007; Garrod, 1985). Some of 
these processes include selective attention (Franconeri et al., 
2012) guided by relevance (Florax & Ploetzner, 2010) and 
background knowledge (Glenberg & Robertson, 1999). In 
fact, the necessity of activating inference processes may be 
beneficial for deep understanding (McNamara et al., 1996). 
However, coming from research unrelated to problem solv-
ing, this work does not reveal any particular sequence of 
interpretation processes. Our analysis of thoughts verbal-
ised during Origami paper folding sheds more light on these 
issues in the form of recurring patterns in the language data. 
Participants gradually moved away from the original wording 
toward a reconceptualisation of an instructional step. Starting 
out by reading parts of the instructions verbatim, they quickly 
turned to minor reformulations, then added additional ideas, 
before evaluating their product. To our knowledge, our 
approach provides the first operationalisation for the system-
atic analysis of verbalisations related to an instruction inter-
pretation process (including reading and picture comprehen-
sion and transfer toward real world action). 
Task reconceptualisation, as reflected in our annotation 
category of Additional ideas, may be viewed as a verbal rep-
resentation of a cognitive process essential to Origami paper 
folding—namely, transferring the abstract textual content 
(supported by a 2-D picture) to concrete action. To do this, 
people need to understand the instruction and (creatively) 
interpret (or, indeed, reconceptualise) it in relation to their 
own product—going well beyond a direct or (nearly) auto-
matic transfer from readily laid out operations that leave no 
room for problem solving. In some cases, they formulate 
specific additional ideas that are particularly clear in their 
own minds. In other cases, the interpretation and reconcep-
tualisation processes may not be verbalised even if they do 
occur on some, perhaps less consciously accessible, level. 
Generally, people do not explicitly formulate the transfer 
process when thinking aloud (e.g., by saying “I am now try-
ing to transfer this instruction to the piece of paper in my 
hand”)—this would be easily accessible through content 
analysis (Krippendorff, 2004). Instead, the present study 
gained insights into participants’ thoughts through a close 
analysis of the language data. This analysis revealed insights 
beyond the content of the explicit verbalisations by identify-
ing utterance types relative to the instruction, and by analys-
ing spatial term use. This approach is in line with Cognitive 
Discourse Analysis (CODA, Tenbrink, 2015), with its main 
goal of interpreting language use in relation to thought. 
The present analysis highlighted thought processes dur-
ing instruction interpretation, and led to further insights 
about the role of verbalisation. As suggested by Taylor and 
Tenbrink (2013), access to relevant vocabulary for an idea 
can be helpful when implementing that idea on subsequent 
tasks. Another striking aspect of the reconceptualisation, 
as observed here, is the fact that many participants actually 
volunteered revised spatial descriptions, associating various 
concepts and spatial relationships. This suggests that partici-
pants actively sought to thoroughly understand the spatial 
situation, and expressed their own representation beyond 
the one provided.
The idea that people transform and reconceptualise a 
description in relation to the real world situation at hand 
resonates with findings in other areas of spatial discourse. 
According to Tenbrink et al. (2008), recipients of spatial 
instructions frequently provide insightful ideas that comple-
ment the verbal instruction given to them, filling in con-
ceptual gaps using available perceptual information. More 
generally, interpreting spatial language inevitably depends 
on intricate inference processes that may involve drawing 
on background knowledge and judgments about the speaker 
providing the description (Gagnon et al., 2012; Gondorf, 
Bergmann, & Tenbrink, 2012). In this light, adding one’s 
own ideas while interpreting an instruction seems only 
natural, since a direct mapping of linguistic descriptions to 
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real-world objects is rarely possible. In route instructions, 
for instance, the main route is laid out in the descriptions, 
but there is still potential to go wrong in the real world for 
many reasons, including miscommunication, memory fail-
ure, reference resolution problems, underspecification, false 
information, and perspective and orientation problems. In 
short, following instructions in a spatial setting introduces a 
range of problems to solve, necessitating creative and active 
thought processes such as those reflected in our think-aloud 
protocols. To our knowledge, our study is the first to outline 
these phenomena in detail based on language data analysis. 
Another frequent and everyday observation relevant to 
our findings is that, upon receiving a complex explanation 
in a face-to-face situation, it may be perceived as insuffi-
cient to simply acknowledge the information by nodding or 
responding “OK.” Such feedback may be due to (or attrib-
uted to) politeness rather than true understanding. Arguably, 
the more complex an instruction or explanation is, the more 
reconceptualisation will be needed to demonstrate deeper 
understanding. This is particularly pertinent in school edu-
cation. Teachers actively elicit summaries and reformulations 
on a regular basis; as written text types, they are integral parts 
of teaching approaches. Being able to summarise and refor-
mulate is thus a skill to be learned because it can demonstrate 
comprehension that goes beyond the input itself (e.g., Chi, 
De Leeuw, Chiu, & Lavancher, 1994).
While reconceptualising and reformulating upon request 
by a teacher may be a cognitive challenge, it may also sup-
port the learning process. Verbalisation and access to asso-
ciated terminology can support cognition, as demonstrated 
by research in two directions. First, various studies have 
indicated an enhancement of problem solving processes 
via verbalisations while doing the task. Fairly uncontro-
versially, providing good and elaborate explanations while 
studying examples correlates with success in problem solv-
ing (Chi et al., 1989); being asked for explanations and back-
ground information supports depth of thought and therefore 
enhances the problem solving process (Bielaczyc, Pirolli, & 
Brown, 1995; Neuman & Schwarz, 1998). However, whether 
or not simply thinking aloud—rather than providing expla-
nations—serves to support cognitive processes appears to 
be dependent on the problem solving task and the way the 
instruction is formulated (Ericsson & Simon, 1984; Fox, 
Ericsson, & Best, 2011; Schooler et al., 1993). 
The present study was designed to address the nature of 
verbalisable cognitive processes rather than their effects on 
performance (with performance measures only affecting 
minor parts of our analysis); a control group without ver-
balisation would not have led to any insights in this regard. 
However, based on the insights gained here, an informative 
next study could explore whether thinking aloud helps par-
ticipants accomplish the Origami tasks successfully. In our 
study, we did not find correlations between success in the 
Origami paper folding task and reconceptualisations in the 
verbal data. However, as discussed in Taylor and Tenbrink 
(2013), use of new spatial terms was correlated with another 
measure, namely performance in the crease-pattern match-
ing task given to participants after the folding task. This indi-
cates that creative verbalisation can relate to performance 
in spatial tasks in somewhat intricate ways. The ability to 
verbalise spatial relations may enhance spatial thinking in a 
general sense, even if it does not directly affect the currently 
verbalised task. 
The second research direction relevant to the cognitive 
effects of verbalisation addresses the relationship between 
language and thought, as critically inspired by Whorf (1941). 
In particular, evidence is accumulating that inner speech 
and labeling systematically support cognition at various lev-
els, ranging from perception to categorisation and memory 
(Lupyan, 2012). Linguistic formulation of perceived catego-
ries appears to support ongoing conceptualisations by cap-
turing fleeting impressions in a temporary way, supported 
further by previous linguistic experience and knowledge. It 
appears that fairly similar processes may be at work in our 
Origami task, in spite of the fact that labels exist, through 
the instructions. Our participants made heavy use of these 
existing formulations by reading aloud and modifying them 
only slightly at first, but then moved on to new conceptuali-
sations and associating linguistic labels with them. Clearly, 
since they were not asked to formulate anything in partic-
ular (just think aloud), they chose descriptions relevant for 
them (i.e., they found labels and highlighted spatial relation-
ships as they became obvious in their minds). Thus, while 
the research reported here was not designed to test whether 
reformulations and reconceptualisations actually support 
the problem solving process, our empirical findings do show 
that this cognitive process is an integral part of a cognitive 
task that is considerably more complex than the labeling of a 
newly encountered object. 
conclusion
Our study provides insights about the cognitive processes 
involved in following Origami paper folding instructions, 
challenging the assumption that following instructions leads 
to straightforward action execution. Instead, problem solving 
can be viewed as a multilayered process—not only in terms 
of high-level (conscious) and low-level (automated) processes, 
but also in terms of main problem solving steps (provided in 
complete instructions) and intermediate problems needing to 
be solved to accomplish these main steps. This level involves 
both high-level and low-level cognitive processes and is there-
fore in part explicitly verbalisable, and in part reflected in the 
linguistic features and patterns of the verbalised data.
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Our results suggest a recurring pattern of gradually mov-
ing away from the original instruction by reading, reformu-
lating, adding ideas and associated concepts, and evaluating 
the folding effort (with a possible addition of background 
experience). This pattern highlights the necessary conceptual 
path involved in interpreting an abstract instruction in such 
a way as to act appropriately in the real world. Specifically, it 
supports the theory that reconceptualisation—be it through 
explicit verbalisations, or only silently in the mind—is an 
important and supportive part of this comprehension pro-
cess. Further research is required to explore the extent to 
which explicit verbalisation introducing new formulations 
can support problem solving processes.
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appendix a
Instructions given to the participant to explain and train how 
to think aloud, following Ericsson and Simon (1984):
“I will, in a minute, give you a task to perform. While 
you do that, I will ask you to THINK ALOUD during 
the whole procedure of the task. We are interested in 
what you think about as you perform the task. Therefore 
I want you to say EVERYTHING you are thinking from 
start to finish of the task. Don’t try to plan out what you 
say and don’t talk to ME. Just act as if you were speaking 
to yourself. It is most important that you keep talking, 
even though you won’t get any response or feedback. 
Do you understand what I want you to do? If I do not 
hear you talking for a bit, I will remind you that you are 
to say aloud what you are thinking.
Good, now we will begin with some practice problems. 
First, I want you to multiply two numbers in your head 
and speak out loud what you are thinking as you get an 
answer. 
What is the result of multiplying 24 x 36?
Good. Any questions? -- Here’s your next practice 
problem: 
How many windows are there in a house you used to 
live in—for example your parents’ house?”
appendix b
Instruction for Task 1—Origami paper folding
“Okay, we are now ready to start with your first 
task. Here [show participant the instruction on the 
screen] is an instruction for an Origami paper fold-
ing task. The aim is to create an Origami paper 
tulip made of two pieces of paper, following these 
instructions. Start with the STEM, which is easier. 
Don’t forget to THINK ALOUD while doing so. 
Take as long as you like. I won’t interrupt you, and I 
won’t judge what you have done. We are interested in 
your thoughts while you do the paper folding. 
Okay? You can start right away. When you’re done with 
the stem, proceed directly with the bloom.”
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4. Turn around 
180 degrees
5. Fold the 
bottom 
edges onto the 
midline. 
6. Fold the 
bottom 
edges onto the 
midline once 
again. 
7. Turn the 
paper over so 
that the back 
side is up.
8. Fold the lower 
tip onto the 
upper one.
appendix c
Illustrated Origami instructions for the flower stem 
Instructions are identical to those used in the study except 
the numbering, which was added here for purposes of refer-
encing in this paper.
This is how you can make the stem
 You’ll need:
•	 Square green 
paper 
Instructions for the stem
1. Put the paper 
in front of 
you, with one 
corner point-
ing towards 
you.
2. Fold the left 
corner over to 
the right one, 
and firmly 
straighten out 
the fold. 
3. Open the 
paper again. 
 
Fold the bot-
tom edges 
toward the 
midline. 
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9. Fold the left 
half over the 
right one.  
 
Fold it back 
again.
10. Turn the  
paper over. 
 
Fold the over-
lying layer of 
the upper tip 
diagonally to 
the right (kind 
of like in the 
picture) 
11. Fold it back, 
and then 
diagonally to 
the left. 
12. Fold the tip 
back. 
 
Fold the upper 
tip toward the 
inside along 
the fold lines. 
13. Push the left 
and the right 
half of the 
stem together.
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appendix d
Remaining new spatial terms (complementing Figure 1) 
sorted according to the absolute number of occurrence.
